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Abstract 
 
We investigate the impact of global and local crises on bank stability and examine the 
effect of owning bank subsidiaries in other countries. We consider banks from MENA 
countries which experienced both types of crises during our sample period. Our findings 
highlight a negative impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 on bank stability 
but, on the whole, no negative impact of the 'Arab Spring'. A deeper investigation shows 
that owning subsidiaries outside the home country is a source of increased fragility 
during normal times, yet a source of higher stability during the 'Arab Spring' but not 
during the global financial crisis. Moreover, owning foreign subsidiaries in one or two 
world regions is insufficient to neutralize the ‘Arab Spring’ crisis, while being present in 
three or more regions is more stabilizing during the 'Arab Spring' but also more 
destabilizing during  the global financial crisis. Our findings contribute to the literature 
examining bank stability and have several policy implications. 
JEL classification: G01, G21, G28  
Keywords : Financial crises, Bank stability, Subsidiaries, MENA region. 
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Abstract 
 
We investigate the impact of global and local crises on bank stability and examine the 
effect of owning bank subsidiaries in other countries. We consider banks from MENA 
countries which experienced both types of crises during our sample period. Our findings 
highlight a negative impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 on bank stability 
but, on the whole, no negative impact of the 'Arab Spring'. A deeper investigation shows 
that owning subsidiaries outside the home country is a source of increased fragility 
during normal times, yet a source of higher stability during the 'Arab Spring' but not 
during the global financial crisis. Moreover, owning foreign subsidiaries in one or two 
world regions is insufficient to neutralize the ‘Arab Spring’ crisis, while being present in 
three or more regions is more stabilizing during the 'Arab Spring' but also more 
destabilizing during  the global financial crisis. Our findings contribute to the literature 
examining bank stability and have several policy implications. 
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1. Introduction 
 The literature has documented numerous cases where political instability or crisis 
has significantly increased financial market volatility (Goodell & Vähämaa, 2013). 
Moreover, such episodes are also known to severely affect the stability of the banking 
system leading to an increase in the probability of a banking crisis (Vaugirard, 2007) 
(Khandelwal & Roitman, 2013). Several examples of contagion to other countries are 
also evident starting from 1994-1995 with the ‘Tequila Crisis’, the ‘Asian Flu’ of 1997-
1998, the ‘Russian Virus of 1998, the 1998-1999 ‘Brazilian Crisis’, and ending with the 
‘Subprime Crisis’ in 2007-2008. These prior incidents have shown that shocks from one 
country can overwhelm “within a matter of days countries having no apparent link with 
the crisis country” (Mati, 2008).  
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 In this paper, we take the MENA region as a laboratory to investigate possible 
differences between international and local shocks. Specifically, we examine the impact 
of the so-called 'Arab Spring' and the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 on the stability 
of banks in the MENA region and whether stability is differently affected by such crises. 
Moreover, we investigate how owning foreign subsidiaries makes banks more or less 
vulnerable in their home country during normal times and during such shocks, either 
regional or international.  
 MENA banks are, on average, better capitalized and more profitable than banks in 
the U.S.  and the Eurozone1 but their recent expansion might also make them more 
exposed as they tend to play a more important role at the regional but also global level 
through the subsidiaries they own worldwide. MENA region ranks second after East 
Asia, in terms of bank assets to GDP ratio, and ahead of Eastern Europe, South Asia, and 
Latin America (Anzoategui, et al., 2010). Furthermore, Islamic banks in the region 
account for 72% of total Islamic banks assets in the world. Consequently, investigating 
the vulnerability of MENA banks to regional or global shocks is an important question. 
 The so-called ‘Arab Spring’ started in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread to 
other countries in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). The political crisis 
unfolded to Egypt in January 2011, finding its way to Yemen in the same month and to 
Libya and Bahrain in the following February, and finally reaching Syria in March. The 
‘Arab Spring’ led to political reforms and new policies and regulations in other countries, 
to prevent the possibility of similar uprisings. As a consequence, financial markets 
negatively responded to the turbulences recording, for example, a 16% drop in Egypt to 
the lowest level in 2 years while the Tunisian stock exchange also declined significantly 
(Chau, et al., 2014). The MENA region has had a long history of political instability, 
violence, and war. Such turbulences have had a negative, and sometimes devastating, 
effect on economic growth in the region (Tang & Abosedra, 2014). The magnitude of the 
current political unrest, nonetheless, is unprecedented before. 
 
                                                 
1 Equity to total assets is at an average of 11.4% in the MENA region compared to 11.2% and 6.9% in the 
U.S. and the Eurozone, respectively. On average the return on equity of MENA banks is also higher : 
13.5%, 12.2% and 5.9% in MENA, The U.S., and the Eurozone, respectively (source: Bankscope). 
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 Few papers have examined the impact of the 'Arab Spring' on financial system 
stability. (Chau et al., 2014) examine the volatility of major stock markets in the MENA 
region and find that the 'Arab Spring' is associated with an increase in volatility of all 
MENA stock markets. Their results also highlight that the observed market volatility is 
mainly driven by Islamic indices rather than commercial ones. Using a sample of 41 
banks, (Love & Ariss, 2014) study the macro-economic shock transmission of the ‘Arab 
Spring’ to banks in Egypt. Their findings confirm that macroeconomic shocks are 
actually transmitted to the banking sector. Moreover, the drop in capital inflows 
following the ‘Arab spring’ events is found to be a key determinant of the loan portfolio 
quality in their sample. Ghosh (2015) investigates the effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ on the 
risk and returns of banks in 12 MENA countries encompassing three of the six countries 
directly affected by the political turmoil. His results show lower profitability and 
increased risk for banks in countries that were affected by the ‘Arab Spring’ compared to 
the remaining countries in the sample. Moreover, Islamic banks showed an increase in 
risk compared to their conventional (commercial) counterparts.  
 Political instability occurs when either planned or unplanned political events 
happen; elections are a good example of the first event, while uprisings are an example of 
the second. Other shocks that can have an effect on the financial sector are terrorist 
attacks (9/11 attacks) or wars (Gulf Wars). The main bulk of political instability literature 
has focused on the effects of elections on different aspects of financial markets and 
banks. Białkowski, Gottschalk, qnd Wisniewski (2008) find an increase in market return 
volatility linked to election periods due to “narrow margin of victory, lack of compulsory 
voting laws, change in the political orientation of the government, or the failure to form a 
government with parliamentary majority”. Julio & Yook (2012) document a decline in 
corporate investment expenditures during election years. (Pástor & Veronesi, 2013) show 
that political uncertainty commands a risk premium in stock markets. (Önder & 
Özyıldırım, 2013) find that, during election years, state owned banks have significantly 
higher shares in the credit market, while the results obtained by Chen and Liu (2013) tell 
a different story, private banks showing higher loan growth and ROA. Francis, Hasan, 
and Zhu (2014) show that both  political uncertainty and the exposure to it increase the 
cost of debt and tighten bank loan contracting. Charles and Olivier (2014) link large stock 
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market volatility shocks, over a period ranging between 1928 to 2013, to several events 
including elections, wars, and terrorist attacks, among others. Liu and Ngo (2014) show 
that bank failure is around 45% less likely to happen during the election year. 
 Other risk and stability studies of the MENA region find a negative relationship 
between financial openness and bank risk taking and a positive relationship between 
disclosure and stability (Bourgain, et al., 2012). (Srairi, 2013) finds a negative 
relationship between ownership concentration and risk taking. He also finds state-owned 
banks to be riskier than privately owned ones, Islamic banks being as stable as their 
conventional counterparts. Larger banks that are less diversified and which operate in 
concentrated markets are also found to be more stable (Maghyereh & Awartani, 2014). 
(Saeed & Izzeldin, 2014) examine 106 Islamic and conventional banks in GCC2 countries 
and 3 non GCC countries in the MENA region. On the one hand, they find that a decrease 
in default risk for conventional banks is associated with a decrease in efficiency. Islamic 
banks, on the other hand, show no tradeoff between default risk and efficiency.  
 This paper extends the existing literature in several directions. First, we examine 
the influence of banks' foreign subsidiaries3 on the stability of ‘home’ rather than ‘host’ 
banking sector during both regional and global shocks (political and financial). Second, 
to our best knowledge, while earlier studies have mainly focused on the effect of the 
'Arab Spring'  on stock market volatility in MENA countries (Chau et al., 2014), we 
examine its implications on the safety and soundness of banks in all MENA region 
countries. Third, in the process, we also investigate the determinants of bank stability in 
the MENA region as a whole and provide insights for better risk monitoring and 
supervision by regulators. Third, we compare the impact of the global financial crisis of 
2007-2008 and that of the regional political instability of 2011-2012 on the stability of 
the banking sector.  
 We consider a sample of 336 banks from 21 MENA countries covering the 2004-
2012 period, and find that banks did not suffer from lower stability during the ‘Arab 
Spring’. Conversely, the global financial crisis had a greater effect on the region as a 
                                                 
2 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates. 
3 The term ‘foreign subsidiaries’ will be used throughout this paper to refer to subsidiaries owned by banks 
in the sample, and are operating in countries other than the country of main operations. 
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whole by significantly decreasing bank stability. We find that financial openness 
measured by the banks’ ability to own subsidiaries outside their home country was a 
source of increased fragility throughout the sample years, yet a source of higher stability 
during the 'Arab Spring' but not during the global financial crisis. This positive effect of 
owning foreign subsidiaries on stability during the ‘Arab Spring’ is mainly associated 
with a decrease in leverage risk, suggesting a possible transfer of funds during the 
regional crisis. Additionally, banks with subsidiaries in South America show lower 
stability throughout the sample period, while owning subsidiaries in South America, 
Europe, and the MENA region contributes to higher stability during the Arab Spring. 
Subsidiaries located in Europe are found to negatively affect MENA region banks during 
the global financial crisis. Lastly, owning foreign subsidiaries in one or two world 
regions does not hedge from the effects of the ‘Arab Spring’, while being present in three 
or more regions is  more stabilizing during the Arab Spring and more destabilizing during  
the global financial crisis. Being either a conventional bank or an Islamic bank (including 
a conventional bank with an Islamic window) does not significantly impact stability. A 
negative relationship is found between bank stability and ownership concentration and 
loan growth.  
 The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 provides insight on the banking sector in 
the MENA region. Definitions of dependent and independent variables, in addition to the 
empirical model are presented in section 3. Section 4 documents the regression results, 
and additional robustness checks can be found in section 5. Finally section 6 concludes. 
 
2. MENA banking sector background 
 The banking sector in the MENA region, and the entire financial environment, 
have undergone profound transformation and deregulation throughout the past two 
decades.  Despite being relatively young (most banks established in the 1970s or later), 
banking sectors across the MENA region are considered among the “biggest and deepest” 
in the emerging and developing world (Anzoategui, et al., 2010). However, it should be 
noted that some of the region countries are still in “early stages of financial development 
and have a weak legal and supervisory environment” (Bourgain, et al., 2012). The 
importance of the MENA region stems from lying at the “cross-roads of major sea and 
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trading routes with easy access to Europe, Africa, and the near East” (Malik & 
Awadallah, 2013), in addition to its fast growing economies and financial sectors. It 
includes the rapidly expanding, oil rich countries as well as a mixed banking sector of 
Islamic and conventional banks that contains the largest Islamic banks (Olson & Zoubi, 
2011). Countries in the MENA region are considered homogeneous to some extent, “with 
a population of 350 Million people sharing a common language, culture, and rich trading 
civilization” (Malik & Awadallah, 2013). Nevertheless, differences such as in the size of 
the economy, financial development and per capita GDP are evident. As such, the World 
Bank classification distributed MENA countries into three income levels being: High-
income, Upper-middle-income, and Lower-middle-income (8, 6, and 7 countries, 
respectively). To shed light on the characteristics of the banking sector in the region, 
selected indicators are listed in table (1). Loans to deposits measure the ability of banks to 
transfer costly deposits into profiting loans with a higher ratio indicating higher 
intermediation efficiency. However, a ratio exceeding one suggests that part of the 
lending is funded by sources other than deposits, which could lead to instability (Beck, et 
al., 2009). Overheads to total assets and net interest margin reflect the intermediation cost 
of banks, higher values signal an elevated level of cost inefficiency and intermediation 
cost (Soedarmono & Tarazi, 2013). Concentration is the ratio of the three largest bank’s 
assets to total banking sector assets, while ROA is return on assets (profitability) and Z-
score is an indicator of bank stability. A higher ratio of Z-score indicates a more stable 
banking sector4. As shown in table (1), banking sectors in the MENA region are more 
stable and more profitable than their counterparts in OECD countries. They are also less 
efficient and slightly more concentrated. 
 The majority of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are above the 
region average with regards to loans to deposits, net interest margin, and ROA. On the 
contrary, these countries are below average when it comes to overheads to total assets 
and Z-score. In other words, banks in GCC countries are more profitable, more cost-
efficient, and riskier than other banks in the region.  
 Banks in the MENA region started as either state or family owned and are still the 
dominant financial institutions in essentially bank based economies even though some 
                                                 
4 All these figures are taken from the World Bank Financial Development and Structure Dataset 
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countries have active financial markets. During the past couple of decades, many state-
owned banks were privatized, family banks were listed, Islamic banks gained higher 
market shares, and foreign banks entered the market due to reduced barriers of entry. The 
presence of international financial intermediaries led to domestic banks enhancing their 
organizational and capital structure to remain competitive (Turk-Ariss, 2009). Moreover, 
some of the region’s banks have implemented pillars 1, 2, and 3 of the Basel II accord 
since 2005 and will be gradually implementing Basel III recommendations starting late 
20145. 
[[ insert table 1 here ]] 
 
 
 
3. Data, variables, and Empirical Models 
In this section, before presenting our empirical model and our variables, we describe 
our sample.   
 
3.1 Sample 
 The sample considered in this study is an unbalanced panel of annual bank-level 
data ranging from 2004 to 2012. We eliminate extreme values at 1% and 99% of all 
variables to mitigate the impact of outliers. After filtering, the sample includes 3024 
bank-year observations, representing 336 banks (246 conventional and 90 Islamic banks) 
from the 21 countries that constitute the MENA region. The number of banks in each 
country is listed between brackets as follows: Algeria (16), Bahrain (32), Djibouti (2), 
Egypt (26), Iran (16), Iraq (16), Israel (11), Jordan (15), Kuwait (17), Lebanon (46), 
Libya (9), Malta (11), Morocco (14), Oman (8), Palestine (5), Qatar (10), Saudi Arabia 
(13), Syria (15), Tunisia (18), UAE (26), Yemen (10). The sample includes state-owned 
and privately-owned banks and both listed and non-listed banks. Bank level data are 
extracted from Bankscope - Bureau van Dijk Database. Data for ownership are double-
checked against banks’ annual reports. Classification of bank type (Islamic, conventional 
with Islamic window, and conventional) is crossed-checked with their respective 
                                                 
5 In the (FSI-BIS, 2012) (FSI-BIS, 2014) surveys, Kuwait was the first country (2005) of their survey 
sample to start implementing the Basel II pillars, while  Egypt was the last one (2011).  
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websites for accuracy. Country-level variables are collected from the world bank 
database.  
 
 
 
3.2 Definition of variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
 The main dependent variable is the Z-score, a widely used proxy of bank risk and 
stability in the literature  (Beck & Laeven, 2006) (Boyd, et al., 2007) ( Laeven & Ross , 
2007) (Laeven & Levine, 2009) (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010) (Fu, et al., 2014). 
This index is defined as: 
Z-score = 
ROA + CAR 
(1) 
σ ROA 
Where ROA is the return on assets, CAR is the ratio of total equity to total assets, and 
σROA is the standard deviation of ROA. We apply moving mean and standard deviation 
estimates with a three-year window. This risk measure is associated with the probability 
of bank failure; it represents the number of standard deviations below the expected value 
of bank’s return on assets before equity is depleted and the bank is insolvent. Higher 
levels of Z-score are linked to higher levels of stability, as Z-score is the inverse of the 
probability of insolvency (Boyd & Runkle, 1993) (Boyd, et al., 2006).  
To identify the driving component of the Z-score, we follow (Goyeau & Tarazi, 1992) 
(Lepetit, et al., 2008), (Barry, et al., 2011), and (Köhler, 2014) in breaking the Z-score 
into its two main components Z1 and Z2 and using them as dependent variables: 
 
Z1 = 
average ROA 
(2) 
σ ROA 
Z2 = 
average CAR 
(3) 
σ ROA 
Z1 is a proxy for asset risk, while Z2 denotes leverage risk. An increase in Z1 (Z2) is 
associated with a decrease in asset (leverage) risk. 
Z-score, Z1, and Z2 are highly skewed, however the natural logarithm of these variables 
is normally distributed and commonly used in the banking literature (i.e. Laeven and 
Levine, 2009).  
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3.2.2 Independent variables 
3.2.2.1 Main variables 
 To capture the effect of the ‘Arab Spring’ on the stability of the banking sector in 
the MENA region, a dummy variable ASdate is introduced. ASdate takes the value of one 
if the year is 2011 or 2012, or zero otherwise. To account for the global financial crisis of 
2007-2008, we include a dummy variable, GFC, which holds the value of one if the year 
is 2008 or 2009, or zero for remaining years6. 
We also introduce a variable, FS, to control for the effects of owning foreign subsidiaries. 
The term foreign subsidiaries is used here to express subsidiaries operating in a country 
other than the home country of the mother bank. The variable included in the main 
regression is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank holds one or more 
subsidiaries and zero otherwise, while a continuous variable reflecting the actual number 
of owned subsidiaries, FS_C, is used as a robustness check. We also include interaction 
terms FS_AS and FS_GFC to account for the effects of owning foreign subsidiaries 
during the Arab Spring and during the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, respectively. 
Most of the research dedicated to subsidiaries has focused on their effect on the host 
country banking industry and found on the one hand that they provide increased stability 
during host country crisis, higher access to finance, increased efficiency and 
competitiveness, and lower lending costs (Claessens, 2006), (Wu, et al., 2011), (Jeon, et 
al., 2011), and (Bremus & , 2015). On the other hand, they could transmit shocks from 
home country and destabilize host countries, (Popov & Udell, 2012) (Jeon, et al., 2013). 
In general, owning subsidiaries could be beneficial to the mother bank in terms of 
stability if they perform well; through channeling funds and profits that could compensate 
for any volatility in funding and earnings of the mother bank. They could also be a source 
of increased instability if they were in need of constant liquidity injection. Building on 
the existing literature, we expect these subsidiaries to be a source of stability during a 
domestic crisis, and a source of instability during a global crisis. To further examine the 
effects of owning foreign subsidiaries we group them into separate world regions and 
define six variables that indicate their location : Africa (FS_Africa), (South America 
                                                 
6 (Neaime, 2012) shows that the crisis reached the MENA region stock markets in 2008, decreasing stock 
market capitalization from 1,189,187 (Mil USD) in 2007 to 645,211 (Mil USD) in 2008. (Guyot, et al., 
2014) also document a sharp decrease in Egypt market capitalization in 2008, compared to 2007. 
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(FS_S_America), Asia (FS_Asia), Australia (FS_Australia), Europe (FS_Europe), 
MENA (FS_MENA), and the U.S. (FS_USA). We also investigate the possible effects of 
owning subsidiaries in only one region, two regions, and three or more regions. 
3.2.2.2 Control variables 
 Throughout the years, governmentally owned and privately owned banks have 
become somewhat identical in their service and product range, despite having different 
objectives. They also compete in the same markets and under the same regulations. 
Public and private banks became “virtually indistinguishable in terms of their range of 
activities” (Iannotta, et al., 2007). To account for ownership type, state-owned or private-
owned, we follow (Barry, et al., 2011) and (Iannotta, et al., 2013) by introducing a 
continuous variable, GOBs, defined as the actual percentage of the bank's equity held by 
the local government.  
We also identify three types of banks which are in theory of different nature: Islamic 
banks, conventional banks with Islamic window, and purely conventional (commercial) 
banks. Dummy variables Conventional, Islamic, and Window take the value of one if the 
bank is conventional, Islamic, or conventional with Islamic window, respectively, and 
zero otherwise. Islamic banks could be found to be less stable than conventional ones 
(Čihák & Hesse, 2010), more stable (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013), or even equally 
stable/unstable (Abedifar, et al., 2013). 
 The variable ‘OC’ refers to the shareholder ownership concentration, i.e. the 
highest share of equity held by a single shareholder. Although a noteworthy number of 
studies have evaluated the relationship between ownership concentration and risk taking, 
the sign and nature of the relationship, however, is ambiguous.  On the one hand, banks 
with higher ownership concentration could exhibit higher risk taking and insolvency risk 
(Haw, et al., 2010) (Laeven & Levine, 2009) as the increase in ownership concentration 
could result in an increase in the shareholders' power to engage in riskier activities based 
on their interests. On the other hand, an increase in ownership concentration is found to 
be related to lower risk (Shehzad, et al., 2010) (García-Marco & Robles-Fernández, 
2008) due to increased corporate control and monitoring of management decisions and 
actions. 
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 We also control for leverage by including the capital asset ratio, CAR, defined as 
the ratio of equity to total assets. Higher equity provides greater cushion against losses 
and financial distress.  It also indicates higher risk aversion and  is expected to decrease 
moral hazard incentives and improve monitoring (Diamond, 1984). But higher capital 
could also increase banks' risk-taking capacity and therefore the impact on bank stability 
as a whole is unclear (Abedifar, et al., 2013).  
 We also include the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, NPL, to reflect 
the quality of assets (Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009). This variable is expected to negatively 
affect bank stability.   To capture the effect of bank size on stability, we introduce the 
logarithm of bank total assets: Size. Larger banks have better ability to diversify their risk 
and therefore are expected to be more stable. However, large banks might also have 
incentives to take on higher risk because of Too-Big-To-Fail policies and the presence of 
governmental bailouts (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2013). Bhagat et al., 2015, find a 
negative relationship between bank size and stability, i.e. smaller banks being more stable 
than large banks. Their finding supports the moral hazard approach of Too-Big-To-Fail 
banks as these banks might be taking excessive risk knowing that their losses will be 
partially covered by regulators and hence taxpayers (Tabak, et al., 2013). Beck et al., 
2013, results, however, show that banks with larger size are more stable.  
  Risk is also affected by bank diversification.  Specifically, engaging in non-
interest activities  diversification is found to generate higher higher earnings volatility 
and lower stability (Stiroh & Rumble, 2006) (Stiroh, 2006) (Lepetit, et al., 2008) (De 
Jonghe, 2010). However, some studies provide evidence of higher risk adjusted returns, 
lower cost of debt and increased stability (Gallo, et al., 1996) (Deng, et al., 2007) 
(Chiorazzo, et al., 2008) (Sanya & Wolfe, 2011). This diversification benefit, however, 
depends on the type of the activities undertaken by banks. For instance insurance 
activities are found to reduce the probability of bank failure whereas market activities 
have the opposite effect (Kwan & Laderman, 1999) (DeYoung & Torna, 2013).  
In our study, reliance on nontraditional banking activities is captured by a variable named 
Divers defined as : 
Divers = 1- |   
NIR – OOI 
| 
OI 
NIR: net interest revenue, OOI: other operating income, OI: operating income. 
 
13 
 We also control for concentration by considering  the sum of the squared weights 
of banks assets for every country and in each year, HHI. A higher value indicating higher 
concentration in the banking industry. Higher concentration is expected to either increase 
or lower bank stability. Higher market share and franchise value positively affect 
profitability and provide incentives to take lower risk because of higher bankruptcy costs. 
This, in turn, is expected to enhance bank stability (Keeley, 1990) (Matutes & Vives, 
2000) (Hellman, et al., 2000) (Allen & Gale, 2004). Other studies, nonetheless, find the 
opposite impact because higher market power enables banks to charge higher rates 
possibly increasing borrowers' default risk which could in turn negatively affect bank 
stability. Higher market concentration levels could also induce moral hazard, especially 
in the presence of governmental support (Boyd, et al., 2006) (Fu, et al., 2014) (De Nicoló 
& Loukoianova, 2007). 
 We also account for loan growth, which is also expected to affect bank stability, 
by introducing the yearly growth rate of gross loans, GGL. (Foos, et al., 2010) find 
evidence that loan growth is associated with higher risk taking and lower bank stability, 
as higher loan growth could be attributed to poorer screening process or more aggressive 
expansion strategies. Finally, several variables are included to control for the level and 
growth of a given country’s income, and the impact of foreign direct investment. 
Specifically, we introduce the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, GDP, its growth rate, 
GDP_Growth, and the percentage of change in direct foreign investment (FI_Growth). 
 
3.3 Empirical model 
 To test the impact of the ‘Arab Spring’ on bank stability in the region as a whole, 
and to compare it to the impact of the global financial crisis, we consider the following 
models: 
 
Z-Score ij,t = αi + β1 Arab Spring t + β2 FS ij,t + β3 GOBs ij,t + β4 Type ij,t + 
∑ β5Controls ij, t7𝑘=1  + ∑ Country − Level j, t
3
𝑘=1  + λ j + ε ij,t (2) 
Z-Score ij,t = αi + β1 Global Financial Crisis t + β2 FS ij,t + β3 GOBs ij,t + β4 Type ij,t + 
∑ β5Controls ij, t7𝑘=1  + ∑ Country − Level j, t
3
𝑘=1  + λ j + ε ij,t (3) 
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Where Z-Score is a proxy for bank stability. Dummies for the ‘Arab Spring’ and the 
global financial crisis are presented in equations (2) and (3). FS is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the bank owns one or more foreign subsidiaries, zero otherwise. 
GOBs is the share of governmental ownership of the bank. Type represents a measure of 
three categories of bank type: Islamic banks, conventional banks with Islamic window, 
and pure conventional banks. Controls represent a vector of variables that are commonly 
used to control for bank characteristics. Country-Level is a vector of variables 
representing country control variables. λ is the country fixed effects.   
Z-Score is also replaced by its two components, Z1 (asset risk) and Z2 (leverage risk) in 
equations (2) and (3) to further investigate the sources of stability:  
 
Z1 ij,t = αi + β1 Arab Spring t + β2 FS ij,t + β3 GOBs ij,t + β4 Type ij,t + ∑ β5Controls ij, t7𝑘=1  
+ ∑ Country − Level j, t3𝑘=1  + λ j + ε ij,t  (4) 
 
Z1 ij,t = αi + β1 Global Financial Crisis t + β2 FS ij,t + β3 GOBs ij,t + β4 Type ij,t + 
∑ β5Controls ij, t7𝑘=1  + ∑ Country − Level j, t
3
𝑘=1  + λ j + ε ij,t (5) 
 
Z2 ij,t = αi + β1 Arab Spring t + β2 FS ij,t + β3 GOBs ij,t + β4 Type ij,t + ∑ β5Controls ij, t7𝑘=1  
+ ∑ Country − Level j, t3𝑘=1  + λ j + ε ij,t  (6) 
 
Z2 ij,t = αi + β1 Global Financial Crisis t + β2 FS ij,t + β3 GOBs ij,t + β4 Type ij,t + 
∑ β5Controls ij, t7𝑘=1  + ∑ Country − Level j, t
3
𝑘=1  + λ j + ε ij,t (7) 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table (2) presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. The 
maximum Z-score value (7.74) is recorded in Malta in 2010. The average Z-Score for the 
whole region is 3.59 with Djibouti exhibiting the lowest Z-Score average of 2.89 while 
Morocco and Lebanon show the highest average of 4.14. Year 2009 recorded the lowest 
average Z-Score (3.28) while 2012 recorded the highest (3.93).  
 The highest number of foreign subsidiaries owned by a regional bank is witnessed 
in Bahrain (74). The latter also records the highest number of banks that own one or more 
subsidiaries (20).  
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 27% of the sample banks are Islamic, 11% are conventional banks with Islamic 
window, and the remaining 62% are purely conventional (commercial) banks. While 6 
countries7 out of the 21 in our sample do not have any Islamic banks or windows,  Iran’s 
banking system is 100% Islamic. Lebanon has the highest number of banks (46), whereas 
Bahrain leads the number of Islamic banks with 19 Islamic and 7 Islamic window banks. 
 Banks in Algeria record the highest average ownership concentration with 76.5% 
of shares owned by one shareholder. Iraqi banks exhibit, on average, the highest ratio of 
equity to total assets (35%) while Israel's average is the lowest at 6%. 
 The highest non-performing loans to total loans ratio, NPL, of 83.2% is witnessed 
in Tunisia in 2011. Yemen has the highest average NPL (29%) compared to Qatar 
(1.79%). In terms of size (natural logarithm of total assets), The largest bank (18.05) is in 
UAE while the smallest bank is in Yemen (10.69). Overall, Saudi Arabia has the largest 
banks (average natural logarithm of total assets) whereas Iraq has the smallest ones. In 
terms of competition, Palestine has, on average, the most concentrated banking sector 
(HHI 0.53), while the banking sector in Lebanon is the least concentrated (HHI 0.09). 
However, in absolute values, the highest concentration can be found in Syria (0.67) in 
2006. Iraq recorded the uppermost average loan growth in the region with 53% compared 
to Israel at 5% being the lowest, while the maximum value of loan growth is in Qatar 
(327%) in 2010. The highest GDP per capita is in Qatar while the lowest is in Djibouti. 
 
[[ insert table 2 here ]] 
 
 Table (3) shows the distribution of foreign bank subsidiaries owned by MENA 
banks in different world regions. Bahraini banks have the highest number of foreign 
subsidiaries with 167 subsidiaries covering all seven regions defined in our study, while 
Palestinian banks have the lowest number of foreign subsidiaries (only one) and Djibouti 
has none. MENA region8 is the home of the highest number of foreign subsidiaries (312) 
and Europe is the second highest (205). 90 Subsidiaries in total are in South America. A 
                                                 
7 These countries are Djibouti, Israel, Libya, Malta, Morocco, and Oman. 
8 This includes all subsidiaries outside the main country of operations, yet still within the MENA region. 
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closer look shows that subsidiaries in the Cayman Islands (67) and The British Virgin 
Islands (12) constitute the highest numbers of subsidiaries operating in South America. 
  
[[ insert table 3 here ]] 
 
 125 banks from the MENA region have foreign subsidiaries. Some of these banks 
choose to only expand in one geographical region, while others diversify their 
subsidiaries network by having a presence in several world regions. Table (4) shows the 
number of banks owning subsidiaries in one region, two regions, or three or more 
regions. Almost half (56) of the subsidiary-owning banks have chosen to operate outside 
their country in one region only, 33 of these banks operate in the MENA region.  
[[ insert table 4 here ]] 
 
 Table (5) shows the correlation among all our variables and reveals no major 
collinearity issues.  
[[ insert table 5 here ]] 
 
4.2 Regressions results 
 The Hausman test favors the Fixed Effects (FE) model over the Random Effects 
(RE) model. However, when using FE, several variables that show little change over time 
in addition to time invariant dummies (such as public, Islamic, window …) are omitted 
from the regression. To combine the benefits of FE and RE, i.e. include all relevant time 
invariant dummies, two alternatives  are suggested in the literature; the (Plümper & 
Troeger, 2007) fixed-effects vector decomposition model (FEVD) and the (Hausman & 
Taylor, 1981) model. Our estimations are carried out using the Hausman-Taylor (HT) 
model9.  
 Table (6) reports the results for stability (columns 1 & 4), asset risk (columns 2 & 
5) and leverage risk (columns 3 & 6). The ASdate dummy variable shows a positive and 
                                                 
9 Some studies favor the HT model over the FEVD estimator. See for example, (Breusch, et al., 2011), 
(Breusch, et al., 2011) and (Greene, 2011).  The HT model uses an instrumental variable approach to deal 
with the possible correlation between the explanatory variables and the unobserved individual effects. We 
follow (Baltagi, et al., 2003) in testing the validity of our choice of endogenous variables by running a 
Hausman test between the FE and HT estimators.  
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significant relationship with individual bank stability This increase in stability during the 
‘Arab Spring’ is mainly driven by lower leverage risk (column 3). However, when testing 
for the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, column 4 shows the opposite 
result indicating that banks in the MENA region are more vulnerable to international than 
regional shocks.   
 The results also show that owning subsidiaries in a foreign country, FS, is 
associated with lower levels of stability for the mother-bank throughout the sample 
period. Regarding the control variables, banks with partial or full governmental 
ownership show no difference in stability compared to private ones. Islamic banks and 
conventional banks with Islamic window also show no difference in stability compared to 
their conventional counterparts. This result is in line with (Abedifar, et al., 2013), who 
find no statistically significant difference in stability between Islamic and non-Islamic 
banking models. Nonetheless, column (2) shows that Islamic banks have higher asset risk 
than the conventional ones. Other results also reveal that higher ownership by the major 
shareholder, OC, and higher loan growth, GGL, are associated with lower stability. 
Finally, higher levels of GDP per capita growth are positively linked with bank stability.  
 To further investigate the effects of owning subsidiaries outside the main country 
of operations during a crisis period, we introduce two interaction terms; FS_AS and 
FS_GFC to capture the effect of owning subsidiaries in other countries during the ‘Arab 
Spring’ and during the Global Financial Crisis, respectively. Results in table (7) show 
that, during the 'Arab Spring', owning such subsidiaries is beneficial in terms of bank 
stability. Hence, although owning subsidiaries in foreign countries is detrimental for 
stability during normal times, it has the opposite effect during local political shocks. 
Furthermore, the results also reveal lower leverage risk for such banks during the ‘Arab 
Spring’ suggesting possible capital transfers to the country of origin during regional 
crises. Such a result is in line with those of (Cetorellia & Goldberg, 2012) who show that 
in a response to a funding shock, parent banks reallocate funds back from the subsidiaries 
when they face a liquidity shortage. However, the coefficient associated to the other 
interaction term FS_GFC is not significant. Hence, owning subsidiaries in other countries 
does not alter the negative impact on bank stability of the global financial crisis of 2007-
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2008, possibly because the subsidiaries might be suffering from the crisis themselves 
(column 4). 
[[ insert table 7 here ]] 
 
 For deeper insights, we group foreign subsidiaries based on their geographical 
location.  These world regions are Africa, South America, Asia, Australia, Europe, 
MENA, and the U.S.10. Table (8) shows the results when adding these regions, as well as 
interaction terms between each of the regions and the Arab spring variable in the 
regressions. Subsidiaries in South America are shown to be a source of instability for 
their owning banks in normal times but to a lesser extent during the 'Arab Spring'.  In our 
sample, such subsidiaries are mostly located in the tax haven countries: the Cayman 
Islands and the British Virgin Islands. Nonetheless, banks that own subsidiaries located in 
South America, Europe, and the MENA region enjoy better stability during the Arab 
Spring than during normal times, as can be seen in equations 2, 4, and 5 in table (8). 
 
 [[ insert table 8 here ]] 
In table (9) we look more deeply into the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008. The results show that on the whole owning subsidiaries in most part of the world 
does not alter the impact of the crisis on bank stability.  However, owning subsidiaries in 
Europe during the global financial crisis negatively impacts the stability of the mother 
bank. 
[[ insert table 9 here ]] 
 In table (9) we look more closely into the influence played by the number of 
world regions where banks are present. Owning foreign subsidiaries in three or more 
regions is a source of better stability during the Arab Spring [table (10) column 3], while 
it is a source of instability during the global financial crisis (column 6). Hence, being 
present in one or two regions might not be enough to offset the impact of the Arab 
Spring, but being present in three or more regions is effective. However, such a broad 
geographical presence makes banks more vulnerable to the global financial crisis.  
[[ insert table 10 here ]] 
                                                 
10 Australia is omitted from the regression due to low observations number. 
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5. Robustness checks 
 In this section, we run various regressions to check the validity of the results 
shown in section 4.3. For brevity, we only comment on the robustness of the main 
variables of interest. 
 First, we substitute the HT model with the random effects model. The results from 
the RE estimator remain significant and support the findings of section 4.3 (table 11). 
 Second, instead of a binary variable, we use a continuous variable for foreign 
subsidiaries defined as the actual number of subsidiaries owned by each bank,. The 
results (see table 12) confirm that banks that own subsidiaries in foreign countries are less 
stable throughout the sample period, but more stable during the ‘Arab Spring’ period.  
 Finally, because only Arab speaking countries were directly affected by the 'Arab 
Spring' we restrict our sample to Arab speaking countries of the MENA region.. 
Specifically, we exclude Iran, Israel and Malta. Overall, our main findings remain 
unchanged (table (13)).   
 
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
 Using a sample of 336 banks over the period from 2004 to 2012 in the 21 
countries that comprise the MENA region, this study identifies the determinants of bank 
stability and examines the effects of both local crises, namely the 'Arab Spring', and 
international crises such as the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. Specifically, we 
investigate the possible effects on stability of owning subsidiaries outside the home-land 
of the mother bank during normal times and during the before mentioned crises.  
 On the whole, our results show that while the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 
negatively impacted bank stability in the MENA region, however the 'Arab Spring' didn’t 
have a negative impact.  A deeper look shows that although owning subsidiaries outside 
the main country of operations proved to be a source of instability throughout the sample 
and during the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, yet these subsidiaries were a source 
of increased stability during the ‘Arab Spring’ by decreasing leverage risk. Such findings 
suggests a possible transfer of capital between the subsidiaries and the main bank. 
Furthermore, we find that banks that own subsidiaries in South America are less stable 
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than other banks and that owning subsidiaries in South America, Europe, and the MENA 
region is better for stability during the ‘Arab Spring’ than during normal times. Finally, 
owning foreign subsidiaries in one or two world regions does not mitigate the effect of 
the ‘Arab Spring’. Owning subsidiaries in three or more regions, however, is a source of 
higher stability during the ‘Arab Spring’, but at the expense of negatively affecting the 
stability of the mother banks during the global financial crisis.   
 Our findings have important policy implications. Although banks that expand 
their operations internationally by opening subsidiaries in different world regions appear 
to be more vulnerable in both normal times and during international shocks they are also 
found to be more resilient to local shocks possibly because of their ability to channel 
capital. Hence, such bank geographical diversification is only effective in improving 
stability during specific local shocks and has the opposite effect otherwise. To monitor 
and manage bank stability prudential regulation and bank supervision should closely 
account for the structure of banking groups and their international diversification the 
benefits of which could be counterintuitive.   
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Table 1: Financial Development Indicators (2011) 
Country 
Loans To 
Deposits 
Overheads 
To  Total 
Assets 
Net 
Interest 
Margin 
Concentration ROA Z-Score 
United Arab 
Emirates 
104,44 1,28 3,23 60,89 1,57 21,66 
Bahrain 98,65 1,10 2,14 89,06 1,16 17,57 
Djibouti 42,85 3,90 2,86   1,00 9,89 
Algeria 31,80 1,18 2,24 75,50 1,63 21,49 
Egypt 49,54 1,62 2,50 60,75 0,75 39,54 
Iran 93,84           
Iraq 25,60 2,53 4,19 87,04 3,28 25,33 
Israel 99,91 2,21 2,49 79,93 0,71 24,81 
Jordan 73,25 1,70 3,15 88,22 1,14 44,58 
Kuwait 96,72 1,16 3,07 88,95 1,48 19,10 
Lebanon 36,24 1,37 2,02 51,30 0,94 50,01 
Libya 21,19 0,16 0,03   -0,04 31,09 
Morocco 80,06 1,96 2,62 71,19 1,19 30,59 
Malta 87,98 1,62 2,65 87,12 0,54 13,79 
Oman 120,25 1,99 3,39 72,95 1,39 12,07 
Qatar 80,13 0,94 3,31 86,88 2,68 27,62 
Saudi Arabia 133,75 1,38 2,84 55,33 1,99 14,68 
Syria   1,44 2,53 75,45 0,45 8,54 
Tunisia 131,26 2,12 2,80 41,07 0,41 21,89 
Palestine 40,50 2,97 4,58   1,95 17,94 
Yemen 27,02 2,06 4,20   1,34 30,01 
              
MENA 
average 
73,75 1,73 2,84 73,23 1,28 24,11 
OECD 
average 
117,45 1,43 1,99 70,91 0,38 13,47 
 
Source: World Bank Financial Development and Structure Dataset (November 2013).  
All stated figures are percentages. 
Concentration: Assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks. ROA: Average 
Return on Assets (Net Income/Total Assets). Z-Score: estimated as (ROA+equity/assets)/sd(ROA); 
sd(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA.  
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Z-Score 2128 3.595898 1.165328 0.079596 7.745494 
FS 2904 2.321281 6.447254 0 74 
ASdate 3024 0.222222 0.415809 0 1 
GOBs 2781 17.70683 32.43499 0 100 
Islamic 3024 0.267857 0.442916 0 1 
Window 3024 0.110119 0.31309 0 1 
OC 2718 52.71805 31.00297 5.55 100 
CAR 2162 0.150908 0.106388 0.045281 0.649736 
NPL 1349 9.62894 13.33359 0 83.2 
Size 2412 14.61052 1.66372 10.6929 18.05852 
Divers 2198 0.586992 0.237547 0 0.98977 
HHI 2984 0.186638 0.109391 0.086634 0.678922 
GGL 2115 21.95648 38.14225 -58.8 327.82 
GDP 2807 8.957581 1.110829 6.56103 10.9398 
GDP_Growth 2858 5.150745 3.226483 -5.84 17.99 
FI_Growth 2930 0.287495 1.607285 -6.8 12.85 
 
ASdate, Islamic, and Window are dummy variables that take the value of with one or zero. FS is a 
continuous variable. Z-score, Size, and GDP are natural logarithm of the actual value. HHI ranges between 
0 and 1. Remaining variables are percentages.   
Z-score= Natural logarithm of Z-score, a measure of stability. FS continuous variable representing the 
actual number of foreign subsidiaries owned by each bank. Aspring, ASdate, Islamic, and Window= 
dummy variables that take the value of one if country is directly affected by the ‘Arab Spring’ during 2011 
and 2012, if the date in 2011 or 2012, if the bank is considered Islamic, and if the bank is conventional with 
an Islamic window, respectively, or zero otherwise. GOBs: percentage of bank ownership held by 
governmental institutes. OC: percentage of the highest shareholder shares. CAR= the ratio of equity to total 
assets. NPL: ratio of impaired loans to total loans. Size: natural logarithm of assets. Divers= 1- | (net 
interest revenue – other operating income) / operating income|. HHI= Herfindhal-Hirschman index, a 
measure of market concentration. GGL: growth of gross loans. GDP: natural logarithm of GDP per capita. 
GDP_Growth: annual growth rate of GDP per capita. FI_growth: annual growth rate of foreign 
investments. 
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Table 3 Distribution of Foreign Subsidiaries over regions 
  
Africa 
South 
America 
Asia Australia Europe MENA USA Total 
Algeria 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 5 
Bahrain 7 26 14 2 28 62 28 167 
Djibouti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Egypt 1 0 1 0 5 7 0 14 
Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 6 
Iran 0 0 0 0 10 2 0 12 
Israel 0 2 0 0 24 0 7 33 
Jordan 0 0 0 1 4 24 0 29 
Kuwait 0 12 7 0 25 56 2 102 
Lebanon 4 1 0 2 26 38 0 71 
Libya 8 1 0 0 5 14 0 28 
Malta 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Morocco 18 1 1 0 19 3 0 42 
Oman 4 0 8 0 2 5 0 19 
Palestine 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Qatar 3 17 9 0 14 29 0 72 
Saudi Arabia 0 1 7 0 3 24 0 35 
Syria 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Tunisia 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 4 
Uae 0 28 13 0 33 32 2 108 
Yemen 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 4 
Total 45 89 61 5 205 312 39 756 
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Table 4 List of banks operating in one or more regions 
 
1 region 2 regions 3 or more regions 
Algeria 2 1 0 
Bahrain 8 6 8 
Djibouti 0 0 0 
Egypt 3 2 1 
Iraq 5 0 0 
Iran 2 2 0 
Israel 0 3 1 
Jordan 4 1 1 
Kuwait 4 4 3 
Lebanon 3 7 3 
Libya 0 0 1 
Malta 2 0 0 
Morocco 1 2 1 
Oman 3 0 1 
Palestine 1 0 0 
Qatar 2 1 5 
Saudi Arabia 4 3 2 
Syria 2 0 0 
Tunisia 3 0 0 
UAE 7 4 5 
Yemen 0 1 0 
Total 56 37 32 
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Table 5 correlation matrix 
 
Z-score: Natural logarithm of Z-score, a measure of stability. FS: continuous variable representing the actual number of foreign subsidiaries owned by each 
bank. ASdate, Islamic, and Window= dummy variables that take the value of one if the date is 2011 or 2012, if the bank is considered Islamic, and if the bank is 
conventional with an Islamic window, respectively, or zero otherwise. GOBs: percentage of bank ownership held by governmental institutes. OC: percentage of 
the highest shareholder shares. CAR= the ratio of equity to total assets. NPL: ratio of impaired loans to total loans. Size: natural logarithm of assets. Divers= 1- 
| (net interest revenue – other operating income) / operating income|. HHI= Herfindhal-Hirschman index, a measure of market concentration. GGL: growth of 
gross loans. GDP: natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP_Growth: annual growth rate of GDP per capita. FI_growth: annual growth rate of foreign 
investments. 
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Table 6 MENA banks stability and the effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ and the Global Financial Crisis (Hausman Taylor 
model). 
  Z-score Z1 Z2 Z-score Z1 Z2 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
ASdate 0.451*** 0.146 0.459***       
  (5.6600) (1.6000) (5.8900) 
   
GFC 
  
  -0.324*** -0.199*** -0.329*** 
  
  
  (-5.09) (-2.77) (-5.28) 
FS -0.314** -0.122 -0.228* -0.471*** -0.199 -0.365** 
  (-2.06) (-0.60) (-1.72) (-2.79) (-1.02) (-2.38) 
GOBs 0.002 -0.00345 0.00131 0.000959 -0.00377 0.000228 
  (0.6700) (-0.97) (0.4800) (0.3300) (-1.10) (0.0900) 
Islamic -0.264 -0.754*** -0.256 -0.215 -0.728*** -0.21 
  (-1.24) (-2.96) (-1.31) (-1.04) (-2.96) (-1.13) 
Window 0.0255 -0.0519 -0.0503 -0.102 -0.0948 -0.176 
  (0.1100) (-0.19) (-0.24) (-0.46) (-0.36) (-0.89) 
OC -0.00636** -0.00122 -0.00542** -0.00525* -0.000842 -0.00428* 
  (-2.27) (-0.36) (-2.05) (-1.92) (-0.25) (-1.71) 
CAR 0.123 1.802 1.48 0.468 2.088 1.927 
  (0.1100) (1.2100) (1.1400) (0.4100) (1.4300) (1.5000) 
NPL -0.00802 -0.0135** -0.00565 -0.0071 -0.0142** -0.00402 
  (-1.47) (-2.07) (-1.05) (-1.30) (-2.17) (-0.74) 
SIZE 0.0572 0.129 0.0597 0.206** 0.198* 0.199** 
  (0.5500) (1.1100) (0.6100) (2.0400) (1.7600) (2.1000) 
Divers -0.312 -0.253 -0.363* -0.457** -0.306 -0.516*** 
  (-1.61) (-1.11) (-1.91) (-2.36) (-1.35) (-2.73) 
HHI 1.401 1.313 1.535 2.498 1.904 2.746 
  (0.7300) (0.6000) (0.8100) (1.2900) (0.8700) (1.4400) 
GGL -0.00447*** -0.00395** -0.00448*** -0.00510*** -0.00419*** -0.00499*** 
  (-3.22) (-2.41) (-3.20) (-3.66) (-2.58) (-3.55) 
GDP -0.00299 -0.0091 -0.00588 0.431** 0.155 0.455*** 
  (-0.02) (-0.04) (-0.03) (2.4000) (0.7600) (2.5900) 
GDP_Growth 0.0418*** 0.0488*** 0.0445*** 0.0313*** 0.0456*** 0.0334*** 
  (4.0000) (4.0800) (4.3500) (3.0300) (3.8900) (3.2900) 
FI_Growth -0.00778 -0.000929 -0.00822 0.00149 0.00187 0.00149 
  (-0.44) (-0.04) (-0.47) (0.0800) (0.0900) (0.0900) 
_cons 3.060* 0.373 2.621 -2.860* -2.112 -3.418** 
  (1.6900) (0.1800) (1.5000) (-1.80) (-1.19) (-2.24) 
N 959 910 946 959 910 946 
Country 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t statistic between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Z-score= Natural logarithm of Z-score, a measure of stability. Z1= natural logarithm of Z1, a measure of 
bank asset risk. Z2= natural logarithm of Z2, a measure of leverage risk. FS: dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the bank owns on foreign subsidiary or more, zero otherwise. ASdate, GFC, Islamic, and 
Window are dummy variables that take the value of one if the date is 2011 or 2012, 2008 or 2009, if the 
bank is considered Islamic, and if the bank is conventional with an Islamic window, respectively, or zero 
otherwise. GOBs: percentage of bank ownership held by governmental institutes. OC: percentage of the 
highest shareholder shares. CAR: the ratio of equity to total assets. NPL: ratio of impaired loans to total 
loans. Size: natural logarithm of assets. Divers= 1- | (net interest revenue – other operating income) / 
operating income|. HHI= Herfindhal-Hirschman index, a measure of market concentration. GGL: growth of 
gross loans. GDP: natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP_Growth: annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita. FI_growth: annual growth rate of foreign investments. 
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Table 7 MENA banks stability and the effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ and the Global Financial Crisis  (Hausman Taylor 
model). Effects of subsidiaries during crises 
  Z-score Z1 Z2 Z-score Z1 Z2 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Asdate (β1) 0.266** 0.0105 0.307***       
  -2.4 -0.08 -2.84 
   
GFC (β1) 
  
  -0.283*** -0.209* -0.286*** 
  
  
  (-2.83) (-1.85) (-2.92) 
FS (β2) -0.411** -0.222 -0.324** -0.455*** -0.192 -0.348** 
  (-2.38) (-1.10) (-2.01) (-2.66) (-0.97) (-2.22) 
FS_AS (β3) 0.307** 0.225 0.252** 
   
  -2.39 -1.53 -2.01 
   
FS_GFC (β3) 
  
  -0.0681 0.0171 -0.0731 
  
  
  (-0.53) -0.12 (-0.58) 
GOBs 0.00183 -0.00388 0.00104 0.000931 -0.00392 0.000201 
  -0.62 (-1.10) -0.38 -0.32 (-1.14) -0.08 
Islamic -0.263 -0.750*** -0.256 -0.215 -0.735*** -0.21 
  (-1.24) (-2.93) (-1.30) (-1.04) (-2.99) (-1.13) 
Window 0.027 -0.069 -0.0575 -0.102 -0.0955 -0.176 
  -0.12 (-0.25) (-0.28) (-0.46) (-0.36) (-0.89) 
OC -0.00634** -0.00095 -0.00525** -0.00525* -0.00068 -0.00427* 
  (-2.27) (-0.28) (-2.00) (-1.92) (-0.21) (-1.71) 
CAR 0.325 1.988 1.742 0.506 2.152 1.983 
  -0.29 -1.35 -1.36 -0.44 -1.46 -1.55 
NPL -0.00865 -0.0142** -0.00648 -0.00721 -0.0145** -0.00413 
  (-1.59) (-2.19) (-1.22) (-1.32) (-2.22) (-0.77) 
SIZE 0.07 0.162 0.0844 0.206** 0.195* 0.200** 
  -0.73 -1.5 -0.92 -2.05 -1.73 -2.11 
Divers -0.315 -0.257 -0.365* -0.457** -0.308 -0.517*** 
  (-1.63) (-1.13) (-1.93) (-2.36) (-1.36) (-2.73) 
HHI 1.511 1.448 1.626 2.449 1.893 2.697 
  -0.79 -0.66 -0.87 -1.26 -0.87 -1.42 
GGL -0.00447*** -0.00395** -0.00444*** -0.00510*** -0.00420*** -0.00499*** 
  (-3.23) (-2.42) (-3.18) (-3.66) (-2.59) (-3.54) 
GDP -0.0203 -0.0496 -0.0414 0.429** 0.152 0.453*** 
  (-0.11) (-0.23) (-0.22) -2.39 -0.75 -2.58 
GDP_Growth 0.0420*** 0.0498*** 0.0451*** 0.0313*** 0.0456*** 0.0334*** 
  -4.06 -4.21 -4.45 -3.03 -3.89 -3.3 
FI_Growth -0.00902 -0.0012 -0.00928 0.000795 0.00177 0.000722 
  (-0.51) (-0.06) (-0.54) -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 
_cons 3.042* 0.221 2.556 -2.860* -2.026 -3.422** 
  -1.7 -0.11 -1.48 (-1.80) (-1.15) (-2.24) 
N 959 910 946 959 910 946 
Country 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald: 
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(β2) + (β3) -0.104 - -0.072 - - - 
(β1) + (β3) 0.573*** - 0.559*** - - - 
t statistics between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
Z-score= Natural logarithm of Z-score, a measure of stability. Z1= natural logarithm of Z1, a measure of 
bank asset risk. Z2= natural logarithm of Z2, a measure of leverage risk. FS: dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the bank owns on foreign subsidiary or more, zero otherwise. ASdate, GFC, Islamic, and 
Window are dummy variables that take the value of one if the date is 2011 or 2012, 2008 or 2009, if the 
bank is considered Islamic, and if the bank is conventional with an Islamic window, respectively, or zero 
otherwise. FS_AS: interaction between ASdate and FS. FS_GFC: interaction between FS and GFC. GOBs: 
percentage of bank ownership held by governmental institutes. OC: percentage of the highest shareholder 
shares. CAR: the ratio of equity to total assets. NPL: ratio of impaired loans to total loans. Size: natural 
logarithm of assets. Divers= 1- | (net interest revenue – other operating income) / operating income|. HHI= 
Herfindhal-Hirschman index, a measure of market concentration. GGL: growth of gross loans. GDP: 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP_Growth: annual growth rate of GDP per capita. FI_growth: 
annual growth rate of foreign investments. 
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Table 8 MENA banks stability and the effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ (Hausman Taylor model). Grouped subsidiaries by 
region. Dependent variable is Z-Score. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ASdate (β1) 0.447*** 0.387*** 0.449*** 0.358*** 0.281*** 0.434*** 
  (5.12) (4.32) (5.22) (3.77) (2.74) (4.95) 
FS_Africa  0.205 
     
  (0.55) 
     
FS_Africa_AS 0.052 
     
  (0.16) 
     
FS_S.America (β2) 
 
-0.719*** 
    
  
 
(-2.66) 
    
FS_S.America_AS 
(β3)  
0.466** 
    
  
 
(2.06) 
    
FS_Asia (β2) 
  
0.00765 
   
  
  
(0.03) 
   
FS_Asia_AS (β3) 
  
0.170 
   
  
  
(0.80) 
   
FS_Europe (β2) 
   
-0.036 
  
  
   
(-0.15) 
  
FS_Europe_AS (β3) 
   
0.371** 
  
  
   
(2.42) 
  
FS_MENA (β2) 
    
-0.265 
 
  
    
(-1.26) 
 
FS_MENA_AS (β3) 
    
0.406*** 
 
  
    
(2.94) 
 
FS_USA (β2) 
     
-0.0157 
  
     
(-0.04) 
FS_USA_AS (β3) 
     
0.295 
  
     
(0.93) 
GOBs 0.000936 0.00216 0.000737 0.00111 0.00127 0.000964 
  (0.27) (0.64) (0.21) (0.33) (0.38) (0.29) 
Islamic -0.389* -0.265 -0.390* -0.386* -0.356 -0.390* 
  (-1.72) (-1.14) (-1.68) (-1.68) (-1.57) (-1.68) 
Window 0.00754 0.0819 0.00324 0.0161 0.0385 0.00816 
  (0.03) (0.34) (0.01) (0.07) (0.16) (0.03) 
OC -0.0041 -0.00378 -0.00421 -0.00408 -0.00474 -0.00418 
  (-1.35) (-1.23) (-1.37) (-1.37) (-1.58) (-1.36) 
CAR 0.529 0.772 0.453 0.467 0.458 0.421 
  (0.44) (0.66) (0.37) (0.40) (0.39) (0.35) 
NPL -0.00851 -0.00841 -0.00835 -0.00956* -0.00965* -0.00825 
  (-1.52) (-1.51) (-1.50) (-1.74) (-1.74) (-1.48) 
SIZE 0.0378 0.0678 0.035 0.0132 0.0471 0.0259 
  (0.36) (0.66) (0.32) (0.12) (0.42) (0.24) 
Divers -0.459** -0.437** -0.464** -0.511** -0.415** -0.468** 
  (-2.18) (-2.09) (-2.20) (-2.43) (-1.97) (-2.22) 
HHI 1.244 0.905 1.224 1.16 1.658 0.988 
  (0.61) (0.45) (0.60) (0.57) (0.82) (0.48) 
GGL 
-
0.00409*** 
-
0.00393*** 
-
0.00407*** 
-
0.00410*** 
-
0.00420*** 
-
0.00403*** 
  (-2.83) (-2.73) (-2.81) (-2.85) (-2.93) (-2.79) 
GDP 0.0367 0.0394 0.0417 0.0326 0.00769 0.0551 
  (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.16) (0.04) (0.27) 
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GDP_Growth 0.0393*** 0.0387*** 0.0391*** 0.0408*** 0.0395*** 0.0386*** 
  (3.52) (3.50) (3.51) (3.66) (3.56) (3.46) 
FI_Growth -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 -0.0202 -0.0211 -0.0192 
  (-1.00) (-1.12) (-1.00) (-1.07) (-1.12) (-1.01) 
_cons 3.102 2.431 3.129 3.613* 3.205 3.193 
  (1.59) (1.25) (1.59) (1.83) (1.64) (1.63) 
N 858 858 858 858 858 858 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald: 
      
(β2) + (β3) - -0.253 - 1.65 0.141 - 
(β1) + (β3) - 0.853*** - 0.729*** 0.687*** - 
t statistic is between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
Z-score= Natural logarithm of Z-score, a measure of stability. FS_Africa, FS_S.America, FS_Asia, FS_Europe, 
FS_MENA, FS_USA: dummy variables that take the value of one if the bank owns one foreign subsidiary or 
more in the said region, zero otherwise. FS_Africa_AS, FS_S.America_AS, FS_Asia_AS, FS_Europe_AS, 
FS_MENA_AS, FS_USA_AS: interaction variable between the region variable and the Arab Spring variable. 
ASdate, Islamic, and Window are dummy variables that take the value of one if the date is 2011 or 2012, if 
the bank is considered Islamic, and if the bank is conventional with an Islamic window, respectively, or 
zero otherwise. GOBs: percentage of bank ownership held by governmental institutes. OC: percentage of 
the highest shareholder shares. CAR: the ratio of equity to total assets. NPL: ratio of impaired loans to 
total loans. Size: natural logarithm of assets. Divers= 1- | (net interest revenue – other operating income) 
/ operating income|. HHI= Herfindhal-Hirschman index, a measure of market concentration. GGL: growth 
of gross loans. GDP: natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP_Growth: annual growth rate of GDP per 
capita. FI_growth: annual growth rate of foreign investments. 
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Table 9 MENA banks stability and the effects of the ‘Global Financial Crisis’ (Hausman Taylor model). Grouped 
subsidiaries by region. Dependent variable is Z-Score. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GFC (β1) -0.321*** -0.312*** -0.336*** -0.263*** -0.271*** -0.336*** 
  (-4.54) (-4.31) (-4.89) (-3.25) (-2.97) (-4.78) 
FS_Africa  0.122 
     
  (0.33) 
     
FS_Africa_GFC -0.279 
     
  (-0.92) 
     
FS_S.America (β2) 
 
-0.705*** 
    
  
 
(-2.70) 
    
FS_S.America_GFC 
(β3)  
-0.228 
    
  
 
(-1.02) 
    
FS_Asia 
  
-0.00799 
   
  
  
(-0.03) 
   
FS_Asia_GFC   -0.0714    
-   (-0.32)    
FS_Europe (β2) 
   
-0.111 
  
  
   
(-0.48) 
  
FS_Europe_GFC (β3) 
   
-0.252* 
  
  
   
(-1.69) 
  
FS_MENA (β2) 
    
-0.312 
 
  
    
(-1.50) 
 
FS_MENA_GFC (β3) 
    
-0.154 
 
  
    
(-1.12) 
 
FS_USA (β2) 
     
-0.194 
  
     
(-0.47) 
FS_USA_GFC (β3) 
     
-0.0224 
  
     
(-0.07) 
GOBs -0.000823 0.00079 -0.000706 0.000564 -0.00049 -0.00043 
  (-0.24) (0.24) (-0.21) (0.17) (-0.15) (-0.13) 
Islamic -0.375* -0.195 -0.366 -0.319 -0.33 -0.342 
  (-1.68) (-0.88) (-1.60) (-1.40) (-1.49) (-1.49) 
Window -0.133 -0.0421 -0.13 -0.0893 -0.103 -0.112 
  (-0.55) (-0.18) (-0.54) (-0.38) (-0.43) (-0.47) 
OC -0.00283 -0.0023 -0.0029 -0.0037 -0.00384 -0.00329 
  (-0.95) (-0.78) (-0.96) (-1.26) (-1.31) (-1.09) 
CAR 0.854 0.733 0.777 0.618 0.788 0.744 
  (0.72) (0.63) (0.65) (0.52) (0.66) (0.62) 
NPL -0.00833 -0.00756 -0.00815 -0.00892 -0.00901 -0.0082 
  (-1.51) (-1.36) (-1.47) (-1.62) (-1.63) (-1.48) 
SIZE 0.177* 0.211** 0.179* 0.156 0.212* 0.175* 
  (1.70) (2.04) (1.69) (1.41) (1.87) (1.67) 
Divers -0.622*** -0.588*** -0.611*** -0.618*** -0.561*** -0.608*** 
  (-2.95) (-2.80) (-2.89) (-2.94) (-2.65) (-2.88) 
HHI 2.156 1.828 2.215 2.13 2.011 2.205 
  (1.05) (0.89) (1.08) (1.04) (0.97) (1.07) 
GGL 
-
0.00472*** 
-
0.00464*** 
-
0.00473*** 
-
0.00487*** 
-
0.00502*** 
-
0.00477*** 
  (-3.24) (-3.20) (-3.25) (-3.36) (-3.47) (-3.28) 
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GDP 0.468** 0.435** 0.468** 0.497*** 0.429** 0.476** 
  (2.52) (2.34) (2.49) (2.61) (2.23) (2.55) 
GDP_Growth 0.0305*** 0.0298*** 0.0296*** 0.0309*** 0.0306*** 0.0295*** 
  (2.74) (2.68) (2.68) (2.76) (2.75) (2.64) 
FI_Growth -0.012 -0.0121 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
  (-0.63) (-0.64) (-0.58) (-0.63) (-0.58) (-0.58) 
_cons -2.646 -3.145* -2.679 -2.55 -2.846 -2.694 
  (-1.54) (-1.82) (-1.55) (-1.46) (-1.63) (-1.55) 
N 858 858 858 858 858 858 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald: 
      
(β2) + (β3) - - - -0.363 - - 
(β1) + (β3) - - - -0.515*** - - 
t statistic is between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
Z-score= Natural logarithm of Z-score, a measure of stability. FS_Africa, FS_S.America, FS_Asia, FS_Europe, 
FS_MENA, FS_USA: dummy variables that take the value of one if the bank owns one foreign subsidiary or 
more in the said region, zero otherwise. FS_Africa_GFC, FS_S.America_GFC, FS_Asia_GFC, 
FS_Europe_GFC, FS_MENA_GFC, FS_USA_GFC: interaction variable between the region variable and the 
GFC variable. GFC, Islamic, and Window are dummy variables that take the value of one if the date is 2008 
or 2009, if the bank is considered Islamic, and if the bank is conventional with an Islamic window, 
respectively, or zero otherwise. GOBs: percentage of bank ownership held by governmental institutes. OC: 
percentage of the highest shareholder shares. CAR: the ratio of equity to total assets. NPL: ratio of 
impaired loans to total loans. Size: natural logarithm of assets. Divers= 1- | (net interest revenue – other 
operating income) / operating income|. HHI= Herfindhal-Hirschman index, a measure of market 
concentration. GGL: growth of gross loans. GDP: natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP_Growth: 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita. FI_growth: annual growth rate of foreign investments. 
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Table 10 MENA banks stability and the effects of the ‘Arab Springs’and the ‘Global Financial Crisis’ (Hausman 
Taylor model) for banks with subsidiaries in one region, two regions, and three or more regions. Dependent variable is 
Z-Score. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Asdate (β1) 0.431*** 0.426*** 0.382*** 
   
  (4.48) (4.75) (4.25) 
   
GFC (β1) 
   
-0.400*** -0.302*** -0.289*** 
  
   
(-5.03) (-4.06) (-3.92) 
1 Region (β2) -0.231 
  
-0.295* 
  
  (-1.26) 
  
(-1.65) 
  
1 Region AS (β3) 0.0596 
     
  (0.39) 
     
2 Regions (β2) 
 
-0.228 
  
-0.225 
 
  
 
(-0.98) 
  
(-0.99) 
 
2 Regions AS (β3) 
 
0.174 
    
  
 
(0.90) 
    
3 Regions (β2) 
  
-0.0706 
  
-0.115 
  
  
(-0.27) 
  
(-0.45) 
3 Regions AS (β3) 
  
0.524** 
   
  
  
(2.56) 
   
1 region GFC (β3) 
   
0.246 
  
  
   
(1.58) 
  
2 regions GFC (β3) 
    
-0.227 
 
  
    
(-1.21) 
 
3 regions GFC (β3) 
     
-0.343* 
  
     
(-1.75) 
GOBs 
-
0.0000854 
0.00103 0.000902 -0.00195 -0.000184 -0.000211 
  (-0.02) (0.31) (0.27) (-0.58) (-0.06) (-0.06) 
Islamic -0.411* -0.374 -0.371 -0.397* -0.323 -0.335 
  (-1.83) (-1.63) (-1.63) (-1.81) (-1.44) (-1.49) 
Window -0.0487 0.0293 0.000872 -0.188 -0.0822 -0.116 
  (-0.20) (0.12) 0.00  (-0.78) (-0.35) (-0.48) 
OC -0.00404 -0.00402 -0.00429 -0.00281 -0.0033 -0.00302 
  (-1.33) (-1.33) (-1.42) (-0.94) (-1.11) (-1.02) 
CAR 0.47 0.78 0.265 0.791 0.747 0.88 
  (0.39) (0.66) (0.22) (0.66) (0.63) (0.74) 
NPL -0.00802 -0.00872 -0.00871 -0.00828 -0.00859 -0.00877 
  (-1.44) (-1.56) (-1.57) (-1.49) (-1.56) (-1.59) 
SIZE 0.058 0.061 0.0292 0.191* 0.177* 0.191* 
  (0.55) (0.59) (0.27) (1.85) (1.71) (1.74) 
Divers -0.443** -0.455** -0.500** -0.610*** -0.618*** -0.612*** 
  (-2.11) (-2.16) (-2.38) (-2.90) (-2.94) (-2.91) 
HHI 1.322 1.203 1.35 2.166 2.187 1.968 
  (0.65) (0.59) (0.66) (1.05) (1.06) (0.96) 
GGL 
-
0.00404*** 
-
0.00403*** 
-
0.00397*** 
-
0.00473*** 
-
0.00477*** 
-
0.00479*** 
  (-2.79) (-2.79) (-2.75) (-3.26) (-3.29) (-3.31) 
GDP 0.0194 0.000558 0.0504 0.458** 0.474** 0.452** 
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  (0.09) 0.00  (0.25) (2.46) (2.54) (2.39) 
GDP_Growth 0.0393*** 0.0402*** 0.0393*** 0.0306*** 0.0301*** 0.0304*** 
  (3.52) (3.61) (3.52) (2.76) (2.72) (2.73) 
FI_Growth -0.0186 -0.0201 -0.0188 -0.00903 -0.0102 -0.0128 
  (-0.98) (-1.06) (-1.00) (-0.47) (-0.54) (-0.67) 
_cons 2.956 3.042 3.17 -2.705 -2.665 -2.767 
  (1.52) (1.57) (1.61) (-1.58) (-1.56) (-1.58) 
N 858 858 858 858 858 858 
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald: 
      
(β2) + (β3) - - 0.45 - - -0.458 
(β1) + (β3) - - 0.91*** - - -0.632*** 
t statistic is between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
Z-score= Natural logarithm of Z-score, a measure of stability. 1_region: dummy variables that take the 
value of one if the bank owns a foreign subsidiary in one region, zero otherwise. 2_regions: dummy 
variables that take the value of one if the bank owns a foreign subsidiary in two regions, zero otherwise. 
3_regions: dummy variables that take the value of one if the bank owns a foreign subsidiary in three or 
more regiona, zero otherwise. FS_Africa_AS, FS_S.America_AS, FS_Asia_AS, FS_Europe_AS, FS_MENA_AS, 
FS_USA_AS: interaction variable between the region variable and the Arab Spring variable. ASdate, GFC, 
Islamic, and Window are dummy variables that take the value of one if the date is 2011 or 2012, 2008 or 
2009, if the bank is considered Islamic, and if the bank is conventional with an Islamic window, 
respectively, or zero otherwise. GOBs: percentage of bank ownership held by governmental institutes. OC: 
percentage of the highest shareholder shares. CAR: the ratio of equity to total assets. NPL: ratio of 
impaired loans to total loans. Size: natural logarithm of assets. Divers= 1- | (net interest revenue – other 
operating income) / operating income|. HHI= Herfindhal-Hirschman index, a measure of market 
concentration. GGL: growth of gross loans. GDP: natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP_Growth: 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita. FI_growth: annual growth rate of foreign investments. 
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Table 11: MENA banks stability and the effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ (Random Effects model). 
  Z-score Z1 Z2 Z-score Z1 Z2 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
ASdate 0.310*** 0.0171 0.335***       
  (0.1110) (0.1280) (0.1080) 
   
GFC 
  
  -0.293*** -0.231** -0.287*** 
  
  
  (0.1010) (0.1150) (0.0978) 
FS -0.473*** -0.373** -0.368*** -0.413*** -0.324** -0.307** 
  (0.1380) (0.1490) (0.1290) (0.1370) (0.1460) (0.1260) 
FS_AS 0.297** 0.2260 0.247** 
   
  (0.1290) (0.1490) (0.1260) 
   
FS_GFC 
  
  -0.0564 0.0363 -0.0729 
  
  
  (0.1290) (0.1480) (0.1270) 
GOBs 0.0027 -0.0035 0.0018 0.0026 -0.0036 0.0016 
  (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0023) 
Islamic -0.302* -0.748*** -0.296* -0.2710 -0.746*** -0.2720 
  (0.1820) (0.1970) (0.1690) (0.1820) (0.1960) (0.1680) 
Window 0.0544 -0.1420 -0.0192 -0.0197 -0.1700 -0.0925 
  (0.1900) (0.2070) (0.1760) (0.1900) (0.2060) (0.1750) 
OC -0.00567** -0.0001 -0.00453** -0.00551** 0.0000 -0.00428* 
  (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0022) 
CAR 1.1740 2.038** 2.896*** 1.0250 1.947** 2.949*** 
  (0.7700) (0.9800) (0.8420) (0.7750) (0.9790) (0.8440) 
NPL -0.0147*** -0.0263*** -0.0111*** -0.0132*** -0.0262*** -0.00963*** 
  (0.0036) (0.0049) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0049) (0.0036) 
SIZE 0.101* 0.275*** 0.114** 0.137** 0.285*** 0.149*** 
  (0.0602) (0.0664) (0.0572) (0.0601) (0.0657) (0.0568) 
Divers -0.328* -0.3370 -0.369** -0.467** -0.390* -0.509*** 
  (0.1880) (0.2180) (0.1830) (0.1890) (0.2160) (0.1830) 
HHI 1.2840 1.6900 1.5180 2.1410 2.0040 2.4380 
  (1.9470) (2.2380) (1.9010) (1.9610) (2.2290) (1.9120) 
GGL -0.00438*** -0.00429*** -0.00440*** -0.00529*** -0.00456*** -0.00522*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0014) 
GDP -0.2040 -0.2980 -0.1880 0.385** -0.0915 0.397*** 
  (0.1740) (0.1970) (0.1690) (0.1530) (0.1720) (0.1490) 
GDP_Growth 0.0432*** 0.0538*** 0.0463*** 0.0285*** 0.0486*** 0.0317*** 
  (0.0102) (0.0118) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0099) 
FI_Growth -0.0123 -0.0039 -0.0119 -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0030 
  (0.0179) (0.0211) (0.0174) (0.0180) (0.0210) (0.0175) 
_cons 4.187** 0.6980 3.317** -1.2350 -1.1130 -2.0730 
  (1.6260) (1.8470) (1.5840) (1.4160) (1.5950) (1.3720) 
N 961 911 948 961 911 948 
R2 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.23 
Country effect 
control 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
Z-score= Natural logarithm of Z-score, a measure of stability. Z1= natural logarithm of Z1, a measure of 
bank asset risk. Z2= natural logarithm of Z2, a measure of leverage risk. FS: dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the bank owns on foreign subsidiary or more, zero otherwise. ASdate, GFC, Islamic, and 
Window are dummy variables that take the value of one if the date is 2011 or 2012, 2008 or 2009, if the 
bank is considered Islamic, and if the bank is conventional with an Islamic window, respectively, or zero 
otherwise. FS_AS: interaction between ASdate and FS. FS_GFC: interaction between FS and GFC. GOBs: 
percentage of bank ownership held by governmental institutes. OC: percentage of the highest 
shareholder shares. CAR: the ratio of equity to total assets. NPL: ratio of impaired loans to total loans. 
Size: natural logarithm of assets. Divers= 1- | (net interest revenue – other operating income) / operating 
income|. HHI= Herfindhal-Hirschman index, a measure of market concentration. GGL: growth of gross 
loans. GDP: natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP_Growth: annual growth rate of GDP per capita. 
FI_growth: annual growth rate of foreign investments. 
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Table 12: MENA banks stability and the effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ (Hausman Taylor model) continuous foreign 
subsidiaries. 
  Z-score Z1 Z2 Z-score Z1 Z2 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
ASdate 0.333*** 0.0861 0.343***       
  (0.0892) (0.1040) (0.0872) 
   
GFC 
  
  -0.303*** -0.222*** -0.316*** 
  
  
  (0.0710) (0.0835) (0.0697) 
FS_C -0.0256*** -0.0078 -0.0220*** -0.0234*** -0.0085 -0.0204** 
  (0.0069) (0.0137) (0.0067) (0.0088) (0.0143) (0.0086) 
FS_AS_C 0.0321** 0.0128 0.0323*** 
   
  (0.0126) (0.0146) (0.0122) 
   
FS_GFC_C 
  
  -0.0008 0.0090 0.0004 
  
  
  (0.0088) (0.0127) (0.0086) 
GOBs 0.0023 -0.0037 0.0017 0.0014 -0.0040 0.0008 
  (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0028) 
Islamic -0.2500 -0.760*** -0.2310 -0.2240 -0.746*** -0.2000 
  (0.2180) (0.2610) (0.2000) (0.2180) (0.2510) (0.1930) 
Window -0.0185 -0.1250 -0.0968 -0.1180 -0.1580 -0.1990 
  (0.2320) (0.2750) (0.2110) (0.2310) (0.2650) (0.2030) 
OC -0.00537* 0.0002 -0.00470* -0.0043 0.0006 -0.0036 
  (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0026) 
CAR 0.1430 2.1530 1.3390 0.4210 2.3320 1.7190 
  (1.1620) (1.5350) (1.3220) (1.1600) (1.5210) (1.3170) 
NPL -0.0054 -0.0112* -0.0042 -0.0043 -0.0109* -0.0026 
  (0.0045) (0.0060) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0060) (0.0045) 
SIZE 0.1280 0.209* 0.1150 0.237*** 0.246** 0.222*** 
  (0.0913) (0.1110) (0.0861) (0.0906) (0.1090) (0.0844) 
Divers -0.442** -0.3200 -0.491** -0.540*** -0.3490 -0.601*** 
  (0.1990) (0.2360) (0.1950) (0.2000) (0.2330) (0.1940) 
HHI 1.1590 1.5190 1.3510 2.1890 2.1540 2.5380 
  (1.9490) (2.2360) (1.9040) (1.9810) (2.2430) (1.9430) 
GGL -0.00409*** -0.00348** -0.00419*** -0.00488*** -0.00370** -0.00489*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0014) 
GDP 0.0429 -0.0137 0.0376 0.483*** 0.1650 0.500*** 
  (0.1930) (0.2210) (0.1890) (0.1730) (0.1980) (0.1690) 
GDP_Growth 0.0453*** 0.0525*** 0.0479*** 0.0344*** 0.0485*** 0.0366*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0121) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0119) (0.0102) 
FI_Growth -0.0215 -0.0106 -0.0208 -0.0114 -0.0072 -0.0101 
  (0.0184) (0.0217) (0.0179) (0.0185) (0.0215) (0.0181) 
_cons 1.4610 -1.0030 1.3360 -3.955** -3.130* -4.267*** 
  (1.8020) (2.1050) (1.7360) (1.5930) (1.8630) (1.5310) 
N 929 879 916 929 879 916 
country effect 
control 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
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Z-score= Natural logarithm of Z-score, a measure of stability. Z1= natural logarithm of Z1, a measure of 
bank asset risk. Z2= natural logarithm of Z2, a measure of leverage risk. FS_C: continuous variable 
representing the actual number of foreign subsidiaries owned by each bank. ASdate, GFC, Islamic, and 
Window are dummy variables that take the value of one if the date is 2011 or 2012, 2008 or 2009, if the 
bank is considered Islamic, and if the bank is conventional with an Islamic window, respectively, or zero 
otherwise. FS_AS_C: interaction between ASdate and FS_C. FS_GFC_C: interaction between FS_C and GFC. 
GOBs: percentage of bank ownership held by governmental institutes. OC: percentage of the highest 
shareholder shares. CAR: the ratio of equity to total assets. NPL: ratio of impaired loans to total loans. 
Size: natural logarithm of assets. Divers= 1- | (net interest revenue – other operating income) / operating 
income|. HHI= Herfindhal-Hirschman index, a measure of market concentration. GGL: growth of gross 
loans. GDP: natural logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP_Growth: annual growth rate of GDP per capita. 
FI_growth: annual growth rate of foreign investments. 
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Table 13: MENA banks stability and the effects of the ‘Arab Spring’ (Hausman Taylor model) excluding non-Arab 
countries. 
  Z-score Z1 Z2 Z-score Z1 Z2 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
ASdate 0.283** 0.0103 0.327***       
  (0.0180) (0.9380) (0.0050) 
   
GFC 
  
  -0.308*** -0.277** -0.307*** 
  
  
  (0.0050) (0.0210) (0.0040) 
FS -0.428** -0.1630 -0.346** -0.456** -0.1830 -0.376** 
  (0.0220) (0.4700) (0.0500) (0.0130) (0.4040) (0.0260) 
FS_AS 0.280** 0.2280 0.223* 
   
  (0.0410) (0.1360) (0.0960) 
   
FS_GFC 
  
  -0.0353 0.1090 -0.0412 
  
  
  (0.7980) (0.4730) (0.7610) 
GOBs 0.0008 -0.0052 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0055 -0.0003 
  (0.7890) (0.1800) (0.9130) (0.9030) (0.1390) (0.9180) 
Islamic -0.2750 -0.793*** -0.2560 -0.2220 -0.774*** -0.2040 
  (0.2150) (0.0040) (0.2170) (0.2940) (0.0030) (0.2900) 
Window -0.0125 -0.0590 -0.0821 -0.1250 -0.1210 -0.1980 
  (0.9570) (0.8410) (0.7060) (0.5780) (0.6680) (0.3310) 
OC -0.00717** -0.0023 -0.00665** -0.00657** -0.0019 -0.00609** 
  (0.0210) (0.5620) (0.0220) (0.0270) (0.6080) (0.0260) 
CAR 0.6150 2.587* 1.9010 0.5710 2.507* 1.9430 
  (0.5960) (0.0790) (0.1450) (0.6250) (0.0880) (0.1360) 
NPL -0.0031 -0.0078 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0079 0.0001 
  (0.4970) (0.1790) (0.6650) (0.6840) (0.1720) (0.9850) 
SIZE 0.1200 0.1720 0.1230 0.232** 0.238** 0.233** 
  (0.2230) (0.1180) (0.1940) (0.0230) (0.0350) (0.0170) 
Divers -0.2730 -0.1800 -0.3180 -0.442** -0.2580 -0.493** 
  (0.1840) (0.4530) (0.1160) (0.0310) (0.2730) (0.0140) 
HHI -0.4090 -4.617* -0.2710 0.3340 -4.3010 0.6090 
  (0.8700) (0.0950) (0.9110) (0.8950) (0.1200) (0.8060) 
GGL -0.00374*** -0.00359** -0.00376*** -0.00450*** -0.00378** -0.00444*** 
  (0.0070) (0.0260) (0.0070) (0.0010) (0.0180) (0.0020) 
GDP -0.1550 -0.3040 -0.1560 0.315* -0.1520 0.334* 
  (0.4380) (0.1670) (0.4280) (0.0870) (0.4540) (0.0640) 
GDP_Growth 0.0452*** 0.0566*** 0.0482*** 0.0362*** 0.0549*** 0.0387*** 
  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  (0.0010) 0.0000  0.0000  
FI_Growth -0.0130 -0.0155 -0.0130 -0.0037 -0.0126 -0.0036 
  (0.4770) (0.4550) (0.4670) (0.8420) (0.5420) (0.8400) 
_cons 3.1640 2.7620 2.8640 -2.1560 0.5490 -2.6580 
  (0.1660) (0.2740) (0.1970) (0.3100) (0.8140) (0.1970) 
N 854 807 842 854 807 842 
Country Effect 
control 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors are between parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
 47 
Z-score= Natural logarithm of Z-score, a measure of stability. Z1= natural logarithm of Z1, a measure of 
bank asset risk. Z2= natural logarithm of Z2, a measure of leverage risk (Z-score, Z1 and Z2 are calculated 
using a two year moving window). FS: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank owns on 
foreign subsidiary or more, zero otherwise. ASdate, GFC, Islamic, and Window are dummy variables that 
take the value of one if the date is 2011 or 2012, 2008 or 2009, if the bank is considered Islamic, and if the 
bank is conventional with an Islamic window, respectively, or zero otherwise. FS_AS: interaction between 
ASdate and FS. FS_GFC: interaction between FS and GFC. GOBs: percentage of bank ownership held by 
governmental institutes. OC: percentage of the highest shareholder shares. CAR: the ratio of equity to 
total assets. NPL: ratio of impaired loans to total loans. Size: natural logarithm of assets. Divers= 1- | (net 
interest revenue – other operating income) / operating income|. HHI= Herfindhal-Hirschman index, a 
measure of market concentration. GGL: growth of gross loans. GDP: natural logarithm of GDP per capita. 
GDP_Growth: annual growth rate of GDP per capita. FI_growth: annual growth rate of foreign 
investments. 
